Singapore's Regionalization Gambit: Insights Form the Suzhou-Wuxi Experiment by YEOH, Caroline et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business
9-2003
Singapore's Regionalization Gambit: Insights Form
the Suzhou-Wuxi Experiment
Caroline YEOH
Singapore Management University, carolineyeoh@smu.edu.sg
Jerel Chye Hock LEE
Singapore Management University, gareth.lee.2002@business.smu.edu.sg
Clare Yenping LEE
Singapore Management University, clare.lee.2001@business.smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, and the International Business Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
YEOH, Caroline; LEE, Jerel Chye Hock; and LEE, Clare Yenping. Singapore's Regionalization Gambit: Insights Form the Suzhou-
Wuxi Experiment. (2003). Asia Academy of Management Conference: Challenges of Globalized Business: The Asian Perspective, Kuantan,
10-13 September 2003. Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/2877
Area: Penetrating New Markets 
Submitted to 
Fifth Asian Academy of Management Conference 
Challenges of Globalized Business: The Asian Perspective 
Hyatt Regency, Kuantan, Malaysia  
September 10-13, 2003 
 
 Singapore’s Regionalization Gambit: 
Insights from the Suzhou-Wuxi Experiment 
 
 
 
Caroline YEOH 
 (Email: carolineyeoh@smu.edu.sg) 
 
LEE Chye Hock, Jerel Gareth 
 
LEE Yanping, Clare 
 
 
School of Business 
Singapore Management University 
469 Bukit Timah Road 
Singapore 259756 
 
Tel: (65) 6822 0377 
Fax: (65) 6822 0777 
 
 
         ABSTRACT 
 
The dynamics of international economic competition have prompted 
governments to re-examine accustomed policies, and search for 
alternative strategies, in order to re-position their economies for the 
future. This paper takes a look at Singapore’s search for a 
competitive positioning in the global marketplace, and focuses on 
the city-state’s much-publicized, and controversial, flagship projects 
in China. This strategic initiative is premised on the perceptions that 
Singapore’s positive reputation with multinational corporations, 
and `guanxi’ (or connections) with regional governments, will give 
the regional sites a strategic advantage in the competition for 
investments. This paper finds that the privileges secured for the 
investment enclaves are vulnerable to changes in the socio-political 
milieu, and Singapore’s reputation for efficiency and transparency 
is at risk from the administrative complexities in emerging 
economies. 
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Singapore’s Regionalization Gambit: 
Insights from the Suzhou-Wuxi Experiment 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “In the last 4 to 5 years, Korean, Taiwanese and Hong Kong 
entrepreneurs have moved abroad in a big way mainly because of 
pressure from their own high labour costs and the attraction of 
new high growth markets abroad. They have invested in Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, and more massively in China. In 
10 to 20 years, these investments will give their Gross National 
Product (GNP) a tremendous boost. Unless we do the same, 
Singapore will not have this external boost. 
 
On track record makes me feel confident that we have the men and 
the resources to meet this challenge. We can change our 
orientation … we can and we will spread our wings into the region 
and then to the wider world.” 
              Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew   
- quoted in The Straits Times, January 8, 1993. 
Singapore’s economic development took on a new focus with this explicit declaration by Senior 
Minister Lee. The development of overseas industrial parks was the main thrust of Singapore’s 
regionalization drive, which provided a key component in the strategy to strengthen the island's 
economy (Singapore Ministry of Trade and Industry, 1991). Much optimism towards the 
regional parks' success was prevalent due to Singapore's connections to both multinational 
corporations (MNCs), established from the onset of the city-state's modern economic 
development, as well as guanxi, or connections, to Asian business networks1 (Singapore 
Economic Development Board (SEDB), 1995a, 1995b; Asian Review, 1996; Kraar, 1996; 
Yeung, 1998). The transborder industrialization projects, spearheaded by `Singapore Inc’, were 
intended to result in ‘Singapore-styled’ investment sites in the region. 
 
A brief account of Singapore’s regionalization initiative is first presented to set the context of the 
paper.  This is followed by an update of Singapore's industrial parks in China. The case study 
parks, in Suzhou and Wuxi, are then evaluated on their progress in attracting investment, their 
contribution to the strategic objectives associated with the individual park as well as to the 
Singapore’s broader regionalization initiative. The concluding section considers the implications 
of these experiences for the future of Singapore’s regionalization program. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with business practice preferred by the linked communities of `overseas 
Chinese’,(Redding, 1995, Yeung, 1997, Brown, 1998; Lehmann, 1998), the `bamboo’ network which Singapore made use of in 
its industrial parks in Indonesia and China.  
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REGIONALIZATION … & `SINGAPORE INC’ 
 
The mid-1960s saw the beginnings of the Singapore government’s aggressive approach to woo 
foreign MNCs to fuel the city-state’s economic development. By the early 1980s, rising business 
costs rendered it an imperative for Singapore to shift from labor-intensive activities towards 
higher value-added ones. Singapore’s economic planners sought to expand the island's 
investment horizons through an overseas direct investment program launched in 19882. This 
initiative sought to accelerate access to new technology, or foreign markets, by supporting 
Singapore companies to form joint ventures with overseas companies in Europe and North 
America (Caplen and Ng, 1990; Wong and Ng, 1991; Hughes, 1993; Murray and Perera, 1995). 
Most of these investments proved unsuccessful, resulting in enormous losses by the early 1990s 
(Balakrishnan, 1991; Kanai, 1993; Regnier, 1993). A new phase in the internationalisation 
strategy re-focused on expansion within Asia. The change from internationalisation to 
regionalization was rationalised by the liberalisation of foreign investment controls occurring at 
the time in countries like China, Vietnam and Indonesia, and the high growth rates these 
economies were achieving (SEDB, 1993a, 1993b; 1995b; Kraar, 1996; Kwok, 1996).  
 
The regionalization strategy comprised state-led3 infrastructure projects and a range of 
incentives and regulatory innovations designed to assist private companies and individuals move 
overseas (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993; SEDB, 1995a, 1995b). The Government also 
initiated a series of platforms for strategic discussions and collaboration to market Singapore’s 
overseas industrial parks. The support for government leadership had been further encouraged by 
the success in establishing Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), the first overseas industrial 
township developed by Singapore. Development of BIP commenced in 1990 on the nearby 
Indonesian island of Batam. It subsequently became the model for other townships subsequently 
developed under the regionalization program (Asian Review, 1996; Grundy-Warr et al., 1996; 
Yeung, 1998; Perry and Yeoh, 2000). As well as BIP's successful start, industrial township 
development appealed as it offered a direct role in the regionalization program for GLCs, as well 
as opportunities for small scale services such as transport firms, medical centres, etc, to support 
the projects (Tan, 1995). The program received a further boost when the then-Chinese premier 
Deng Xiaoping invited Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew to develop a model industrial 
township to test the transferability of Singapore's methods4 to China.  
 
Precise objectives for the regionalization program have not been made public, but the starting 
ambition was large. In 1994, it was announced that 2-3 percent of the republic’s resources would 
be directed to infrastructural projects in Asia (Kwok, 1996) and in 1995, it was announced that 
up to 30 percent of Singapore’s reserves would be gradually invested in regional economies to 
                                                          
2
 The main ideas were set out in the policy document, Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (SEDB, 1988). The 
1990 Global Strategies Conference added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB, 1990). 
 
3
 Private sector reluctance in regionalizing was the Government’s raison d`etat that Singapore’s GLCs should lead the 
regionalization drive. The principles of government involvement are rationalized in the 1993 Report of the Committee to Promote 
Enterprise Overseas (chapter 4). For a scholarly discussion on the political economy of Singapore’s development strategy, see 
Rodan (1989), Regnier (1993), Ng, et al. (1992); Huff (1995) and Blomqvist (2001). There is also an extensive political-economy 
literature on Singapore’s regionalization program, succinctly summarized in Yeung (1998). 
 
4
 The project invitation envisaged both infrastructure provision, and the transfer of 'software' associated with Singapore’s social 
and economic policies, endorsing the perception of Singapore’s policy makers that it could market its reputation for efficient, 
non-corrupt administration (see, for example, Cartier, 1995). 
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build up the city-state’s external economy (SEDB, 1995a). The strategic intent is to facilitate 
Singapore’s transition to a ‘total business centre’ by facilitating the relocation of low-value 
manufacturing and the restructuring of the economy into high-value manufacturing, and regional 
co-ordination activities for foreign and indigenous multinationals. ‘Singapore Inc’ will thus be 
instituted, an envisioned pro-business environment highly supportive of its business partners.  
  
THE CHINESE PARKS 
 
The BIP-prototype was adopted in the physical design of the Parks at Suzhou and Wuxi. The 
administrative environment was, however, very different. In Indonesia, the partner of choice was 
a well-connected private-sector conglomerate, and the partnership was given the political 
patronage of senior politicians. China, in contrast, had a more complex administrative and 
regulatory environment, and the projects had to contend with multiple tiers of government 
administration, and the competition (or more precisely, the `fiscal politics’) between these tiers at 
a time of rapid economic and political changes. 
 
Singapore’s primary concern with the Indonesian investments had been to promote the 
restructuring of the Singapore economy, and exploit the economic complementarities of 
neighbouring economies (Perry, 1991; Yeoh et al., 1992; Lee, 1992; Kumar and Siddique, 1994; 
Thant et al., 1994; Peachey et al., 1998). The Suzhou project, from a Singapore perspective, had 
an added agenda of showcasing Singapore’s `success’ model and its transferability to other 
Asian environments. The Wuxi initiative had narrower objectives, based on the perception that 
Singapore government-linked companies (GLCs) have a competitive edge in industrial estate 
development in China because of their links to western business, and access to Chinese business 
and political networks. 
 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) 
 
At 70 km2 and an estimated project cost of US$20 billion, CS-SIP was Singapore’s most 
ambitious flagship project, and also the most controversial. CS-SIP was envisioned as a balanced 
township, with a population of 600,000 and a workforce of 360,000. It was to go beyond the 
BIP-prototype industrial park design, with commercial centres and a full range of urban 
facilities. The project was slated to be the new commercial centre for Suzhou and the 
surrounding areas (SIPAC, 1999). This grandiose goal was encouraged by China’s former 
premier Deng Xiaoping who, it has been said, regarded Singapore as ‘a capitalist version of the 
communist dream’. As Deng put it: 
 
“The social order in Singapore is good, they are strict. We should 
adapt their experience and do better than they do (our emphasis).”   
-  quoted in SIPAC, 1999. 
 
Taking these remarks as an invitation, Singapore’s leaders offered to bring their know-how into 
China, if they could get a free hand to demonstrate it5. From Singapore’s perspective, this 
                                                          
5
 The Singapore model, as applied to CS-SIP, encompasses methods for attracting and developing the commitment of foreign 
companies. It also involved the delivery of social and welfare services to support an efficient and co-operative workforce and a 
work-orientated community. Attributes thought to attain these conditions include welfare provision (encompassing housing, 
medical and retirement needs) self-funded through compulsory employee and employer contributions, high quality infrastructure, 
strict pollution control, service reliability, ‘one-stop’ non-corrupt decision-making, minimum entry or performance regulation and 
transparent financial charges (SIPAC, 1999, Perry & Yeoh, 2000).   
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`mutual’ sharing of ideas, knowledge and know-how was also perceived as a stepping stone for 
Singapore business to venture into the rapidly developing and immense China market. 
Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew personally took charge of the formalization of the 
idea into the development of CS-SIP. The Park was formally launched on May 12, 1994.  
 
CS-SIP was developed through a 65-35 joint venture. The Singapore consortium had a 65 
percent stake in CSSD shared amongst 24 organizations, mainly Singapore GLCs. The Chinese 
consortium had a 35 percent stake in the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development 
Company (CSSD), shared amongst 12 organizations, mainly national state-owned enterprises 
together with Suzhou city. The two consortia retain their separate identity, with projects taken up 
by participants according to their expertise and agreed roles. The work of CSSD was overseen by 
a specially created local authority, the Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee 
(SIPAC). Inter-governmental interest remained through a joint ministerial council. 
 
Singapore optimism over the Suzhou project was encouraged by a series of perceived advantages 
secured at the outset. These included CS-SIP being an inter-governmental development initiative 
which was believed to translate into added security against political risks of investing in China, 
and the township was also afforded preferential policies in part due to its ties and its location 
(Yang, 1997). Limits to the advantages obtained were apparent from the outset. The inter-
governmental endorsement was derailed by the influence of provincial and municipal authorities, 
and their interests in competing projects. Incentives which were granted to SIPAC were 
replicated to other industrial zones. Moreover, a concession that allowed SIPAC to retain 
development revenues, led local administrators to favour projects generating revenue for the 
municipality6.  
 
The situation was aggravated by competition from the Suzhou New District (SND), an industrial 
zone open to foreign investment, which was mooted before CS-SIP and launched in 1989. SND 
continued to be favoured for commercial and housing development as well as investments by 
foreign investors (The Straits Times, May 14, 1999). The Suzhou authorities were reportedly 
exploiting Singapore’s marketing efforts and re-directing investors to SND7. It was difficult to 
retain software advantage within CS-SIP as practices were replicated in SND and other zones.   
 
Singapore’s disappointment was indicated by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s public 
questioning of the commitment of the Chinese partners to the project8 (The Straits Times, 5 
December 1997).  Profitability was not the paramount concern as the Singapore government had 
staked its reputation on the project, thus it had to maintain the credibility of Singapore’s strength 
in township development and management. The subtle, yet crucial difference, in objectives was 
translated into perception differences, protracted conflicts and project delays. Singapore’s main 
gripe was the dismal progress in housing and commercial projects. By end-1998, there were only 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
6
 For a discussion of China’s `fiscal politics’ in an era of decentralization and local autonomy, see Hsing (1998). 
 
7
 For instance, it was reported that Suzhou’s vice-mayor, Wang Jinhua, told potential investors in Germany in 1997 that they 
should invest directly in China without Singapore’s help, and that all of Jiangsu’s resources would go to SND, not CS-SIP (The 
Straits Times, January 15, 1998). For more examples of how local authorities circumvent rules and regulations imposed by the 
central government, see Hsing (1998). 
 
8
 Critics have, however, challenged this position, suggesting that favouritism runs the CS-SIP way. It had political support from 
the Chinese President down, and had autonomy (e.g. in planning and land use) not available elsewhere in China. 
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around 1,000 residents in the township and a total workforce of 6,000 (SIPAC, 1999). The slow 
progress resulted in financial losses for the Singapore-led consortium, which funded the land 
development and infrastructure, and also for Singaporean investors involved in peripheral 
projects. These investors reportedly lost US$77 million over seven years of operations. 
 
In June 1999, it was announced that Singapore would reduce its involvement in the project and 
transfer majority ownership of CSSD to the Chinese consortium from 2001 (The Straits Times, 
June 30, 1999). Official estimates stated that Singapore’s investment in CS-SIP amounted to 
only US$147 million (The Straits Times, August 4, 1999). In January 2001, CS-SIP had 
reportedly attracted 133 projects, with more than 91 operational international firms and 14,000 
employed. The operational statistics on CS-SIP and WSIP are set out in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Singapore’s Industrial Parks in China  
General Information CS-SIP 
(August 2002) 
WSIP 
(June 2002) 
Scale of Development (hectares) 
Investment by Developer (US$ million) 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up (hectares) 
Investment by Tenants (US$ million) 
Export Value (US$ million) 
No. of Employees 
7,000 
12,400 
395 
980 
12,400 
N.A. 
44,000 
 1,000 
872 
55 
235 
>1,000 
1,000 
15,000 
 
Country Profile of Tenants (by % of size of investment)  
CS-SIP* WSIP*  
Japan 
Singapore 
USA 
OECD (excluding US/ Japan/Australia) 
Other Asian countries (and Oceania) 
9.6 
4.1 
30.6 
29.5 
26.2 
 28 
16 
24 
25 
7 
 
Sector Profile of Tenants (by % of size of investment.) 
CS-SIP WSIP  
Electronics 
Electrical 
Precision 
Chemical, Pharmaceutical & Healthcare 
Food & Beverage 
Textile & Light Industries 
Plastic Moulding 
Logistics and Supporting 
Others 
}61.9 
} 
8.8 
12.4 
5.0 
8.3 
- 
3.6 
- 
 27 
13 
27 
7 
- 
- 
- 
11 
6 
 
    Sources:  SembCorp Industries & China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial  
    Park Development Co. Ltd 
 
 
 6 
Interestingly, investments began to pour in thereafter, with profits of US$7.5 million expected in 
2001, the first time since the Park’s inception (The Straits Times, January 19, 2001). CS-SIP’s 
growth continues into 2002, with US$15.4 billion in contractual investments signed to date. Its 
tenant profile included, significantly, a high proportion of American and European investors, 
with some 73 percent of the investments directed into electronics, information technology and 
other high-tech segments. The Park is now an investment hub for 38 Fortune 500 companies 
(Financial Times, December 12, 2002), and is expected to clinch US$20 billion in contractual 
overseas investment by 2004 (The Straits Times, December 19, 2002). CSSD has plans to be 
listed by 2004 as well as to build an international standards high-tech park. According to CS-SIP 
officials, plans are in the pipeline for the completion of the second and third phase of the 
transportation network and other infrastructure developments at a cost of US$10 billion (Oana-
Xinhua News Report, December 18, 2002). 
 
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park (WSIP) 
 
WSIP is located 130 km away from Shanghai, and 80 km northwest of Suzhou. The Park was 
instigated as a real estate development with the potential to cover up to 1000 hectares, making it 
a smaller project than CS-SIP. WSIP started off as a 70-30 joint venture between a Singapore 
consortium9  and the Wuxi municipal authority10. However, in contrast to CS-SIP, Wuxi 
municipality is the sole Chinese partner involved in the project compared with the multiple 
parties involved in CS-SIP. And, unlike CS-SIP, WSIP was negotiated directly with the Wuxi 
authorities11, and this direct involvement has minimized the polarization between the higher 
echelons of Chinese government and the provincial government. Lower land costs are a further 
advantage over CS-SIP. 
  
The Park was designated a national high technology development zone (as part of the Torch 
Program initiated in 1988), and this is reflected in WSIP’s focus on electronics and electrical, 
computer and computer peripherals, control systems and instrumentation, precision engineering, 
telecommunications components, medical and healthcare products, automotive and aerospace 
components, and supporting industries. The basic taxation incentives match those in CS-SIP, 
including 5 years of corporate tax exemption followed by 5 years of reduced tax. WSIP was 
designed for wholly foreign-owned investment and, similar to CS-SIP, there has been an 
emphasis on instigating a ‘one-stop’ administrative service to manage approvals and 
documentation in setting up a new enterprise. The Park is situated on the edge of Wuxi’s urban 
district, but has been designed with its own service facilities, dormitory accommodation and 
executive village.  
 
                                                          
9
 The Singapore consortium is led by SembCorp Industries (SCI), with the other principal investors being Temasek Holdings (the 
Singapore government’s main investment holding company) and the Salim/KMP Group. 
 
10
 The local authority has interests in other industrial estates (e.g. One Zone-Five Parks-One College initiative (which includes 
the Wuxi Software Park, Science & Technology Industrial Park, Machinery & Electronics Industrial Park, Huayang Science & 
Technology Park, and Wuxi Information Technology College) as well as Wuxi University Science & Technology Park. 
Singapore officials we interviewed in July 2002 have highlighted that these other projects are not direct competitors, as only 
WSIP is designed exclusively for wholly foreign-owned ventures. 
 
11
 A Singapore government source attributes the difficulties to the fact that CS-SIP is essentially a central government project: 
“Suzhou is very much a Beijing-Singapore affair, so the co-operation between Singapore and the municipality has not been as 
smooth as in Wuxi, which is a project between Singapore Technologies and the municipality.”  
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WSIP markets itself based on its strategic location, quality service in management, as well as 
first-rate infrastructure, telecommunications and transportation networks. Development of WSIP 
commenced in 1994, and the administration building officially opened in 1996. Singapore’s EDB 
played a recognised part in bringing the first tenants to WSIP, and noticeably, the Park’s anchor 
tenants are mainly MNCs with operations in Singapore. Exports from WSIP exceeded US$1 
billion in 2002, and employment stood at 16,000. The total investment attracted has, nonetheless, 
been below that attracted to CS-SIP12, with a larger representation from Asian investments in 
comparatively lower value-added sectors (Table 1). As at June 2002, employment stood at 
15,000. 
 
WSIP has been developed to its second phase, covering 235 hectares, but has yet to achieve 
commercial viability. The Park chalked up losses of S$3.8 million and S$4.3 million in 1998 and 
1999, respectively, and managed to trim its losses to S$2.8 million in 2000 (Source: SembCorp 
Industries). The Singapore-led consortium decided in mid-2002 to pare its stake in the loss-
making WSIP. The transfer of shareholding and management control would, according SCI 
officials, result in better “alignment of interests and improve the operating efficiency of the park” 
(The Straits Times, May 14, 2002). SCI has provided for an extraordinary loss of S$48.3 million 
for its loans to the Park, and will reduce its stake from 70 percent to 49 percent from 2003. SCI 
also expressed its ultimate interest in divesting its entire interest in WSIP, which it considers to 
be its `non-core business’. 
 
Not unlike CS-SIP, the Chinese partner has recently announced plans to develop the third phase 
of the project, which will double the Park’s size. The Park’s performance is expected to turn 
around in 2002. Interestingly, even though WSIP had not experienced the administrative 
difficulties that plagued CS-SIP, the handover to Chinese management in January 2003 mirrors 
the outcome of CS-SIP. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
CS-SIP and WSIP experienced greater development challenges than anticipated, but the 
investments attracted have provided the basis from which the townships could grow. This may 
suggest that the Singapore model carried some weight13 with investors at risk from 
administrative uncertainties, but it is against the larger political agenda pursued by the Singapore 
government that these flagship projects will ultimately be judged. 
.  
The China projects were expected to benefit from the ability of Singapore’s Chinese elites to 
obtain a special status through their ethnic allegiance and dual connections to overseas Chinese 
and western business networks (SEDB, 1995a, and 1995b). Singapore’s claims of a special 
ability to build connections with mainland China have overlooked the multiple competing groups 
within a common ethnic group. Inter-governmental endorsement at the top has proved 
                                                          
12
 CS-SIP’s government connections have tilted the scale for the large companies. Korea’s Samsung, for example, had 
considered setting up shop in Wuxi, which has the most developed semi-conductor industry in China, but opted for CS-SIP as 
Wuxi was not backed as strongly by the two governments (Law, 1996).  
 
13
 The then Suzhou Mayor, Zhang Xin Sheng readily acknowledged that Suzhou borrowed Singapore’s credibility with 
multinationals (cited in Kraar, 1996:4). 
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insufficient to secure equal commitment in the lower tiers of government. The claims that 
Singapore’s politicians have achieved a special ‘guanxi’ (relationship) with China appear 
misplaced. The cultural divide was nonchalantly pointed out by Chen Deming, Suzhou’s mayor:  
 
“In our cooperation in the past five years, that we have an MOU to 
solve our problems is because of the cultural differences in the two 
countries, and the different understanding of the items in the 
documents …” 
- quoted in The Straits Times, June 30, 1999. 
 
The Suzhou-Wuxi experience suggests that, while there is an interest in learning from Singapore, 
it is simplistic to imagine that ethnic commonality will bring political leverage, and with it, 
economic advantage. The limits of ethnic affiliation have been exposed in the China projects. 
The political cost, as openly admitted, is in the suggestion that Singapore was naive in perceiving 
that it would obtain a special status in China (The Economist, January 3, 1998).  
 
Official commitment to the regionalization program remains14, as is the willingness of 
Singapore’s planners to search for alternative strategies to re-position the regionalization efforts 
(Singapore Ministry of Trade & Industry, 2003). Perhaps, in this strategic re-thinking, the 
intersection of `Singapore Inc’ with the (non-economic) socio-political realities in emerging 
economies will elicit a more positive outcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Singapore’s Economic Review Committee has endorsed this policy directive, and negotiations are at an advanced stage to 
develop Singapore-styled industrial parks in Shanghai and Beijing (China), Hyderabad and Chennai (India) and the TS-21 
Industrial Estate in Laem Chabang ,Thailand. 
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